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3.1 Introduction
Analysis of the relationship between objectives and optimum policies has
a long history, at least back to Tinbergen, Haberler, Meade, and others in
the early 1950s. Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and then Harry Johnson, Max
Corden, and Bhagwati developed it further in a trade context, in Johnson’s
case in his classic “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domes-
tic Distortions” (1965) and for Corden most completely in his Trade Policy
and Economic Welfare (1974).
The general message is that the policy instrument should be targeted
closely on the policy objective, minimizing by-product distortions. In the
context of international trade policy, domestic “market failures” are best ad-
dressed by domestic policies, whereas international trade policies are best re-
served for objectives associated with international trade itself. In the latter
category, as far as national economic objectives are concerned, a country’s
ability to aﬀect its terms of trade is usually regarded as the principal reason
for using a trade policy instrument. Although second-best considerations
may modify these conclusions, they still provide a good starting point.
As far as noneconomic objectives are concerned, similar considerations
apply. To the extent that such objectives are associated with trade as such
(such as to satisfy isolationist objectives), trade policies would be the eﬃ-
cient means to pursue the objective. To the extent that they are essentially
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policies are not optimum policies, in the absence of second-best or admin-
istrative cost considerations.
Most of this analysis has been in relation to trade in goods, where the
goods move between countries but the factors of production and the con-
sumers or users of the goods do not. More recently, appropriate regulation
of services trade has been addressed, within countries and internationally,
particularly in the context of the negotiation of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) and subsequently.
In this paper the policy-objective link is addressed for services. First, the
value of generic, rather than industry- or sector-speciﬁc, policies is empha-
sized. International aviation is referred to to show the problems that can
emerge from sector-speciﬁc policies in the context of (bilateral) interna-
tional agreements. Various objectives for the regulation of services are then
considered. These are objectives associated with foreign investment and es-
tablishment, consumer protection, social and cultural matters, and access
to the services of “essential facilities.” In all of these the desirability of deﬁn-
ing the true objectives clearly and of adopting consistent policies across
sectors and, where appropriate, across international agreements, is high-
lighted. Extensive reference is made to some of the reports of the Australian
Productivity Commission to illuminate these issues.
3.2 Generic Policies
The rules of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) are
mostly framed in forms that cover all goods (although there are exceptions
for agriculture and for clothing and textiles). In the GATS the general rules
are quite modest in comparison. The GATS is a framework agreement with
special provisions being negotiated for each sector. Much of the activity by
the members in the GATS has been sector speciﬁc, with little or no attempt
to develop cross-sector rules or trade-oﬀs.
In some quarters there have been recent attempts to develop generic, or
horizontal, disciplines for services at the domestic and multilateral level
(Mattoo 2000, 483–7). As Mattoo points out, “a generic approach is to be
preferred to a purely sectoral approach for at least three reasons: it
economises on negotiating eﬀort, leads to the creation of disciplines for all
services rather than only the politically important ones, and reduces the
likelihood of negotiations being captured by sectoral interest groups” (484).
In addition, a generic approach helps to ensure that the same criteria and
policies are applied for diﬀerent products and industries to address the
same policy objective. Provided the policies are well chosen, this reduces the
distortions of resource allocation and choice. However, the case here ap-
plies not only to services: it applies to goods as well.
Further, despite the many diﬀerences between some forms of goods trade
and services trade, and the diﬀerent forms of regulation, the arguments for
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cies for services also apply to policies across both goods and services. Where
there are objectives that relate to both goods and services, there is a strong
case for applying generic policies—nationally and internationally—that
embrace both.
As an example of what can develop when services policy is not generic but
is highly industry speciﬁc, international aviation stands out. A very restrictive
framework of bilateral aviation agreements has developed, and the trade-oﬀs
are all within aviation. There is no “nondiscrimination” rule, as there is un-
der both GATT and GATS: indeed, discrimination is of the essence.
For the last ﬁfty-odd years, international aviation has been conducted
within the context of bilateral reciprocity, based on protection of national
designated ﬂag carriers. International aviation (except ground handling
and similar services) is explicitly excluded from the provisions of GATS.
There are now more than three thousand of these bilateral agreements
worldwide. They are based on “freedoms”: that is, nothing is allowed unless
it is explicitly permitted. The agreements typically specify the number of
seats that can be oﬀered by the designated airlines of the two parties to the
agreement for ﬂights between the two countries and whether they may pick
up traﬃc en route and ﬂy beyond the parties. They rarely allow carriage
within the foreign partner. They may also contain provisions relating to
fares, which may range from notiﬁcation to governments to fare approval
or control by governments. Some agreements provide for the sharing of rev-
enue between the airlines of the two parties. Typically the agreements (or
other legislation) limit the foreign ownership of airlines.
Partners to agreements may eﬀectively veto foreign takeovers of airlines
in their partner countries by refusing to recognize an airline as a designated
national airline of the partner country, for the exercise of the rights under
the air services agreement. (This was threatened by the United States when
Aerolineas Argentinas was taken over by Iberian Airlines; in response to
the threat, the United States received concessions from Argentina.) Thus,
the ownership provisions are at the core of the system.
There has been substantial liberalization of air service agreements by
many countries in recent years, but still on a bilateral basis. The United
States has entered into more than thirty bilateral “open-skies” agreements,
which involve the removal of most of the restrictions on capacity and routes
but still prohibit foreign airlines from carrying domestic passengers within
the United States, and they do not ease the tight restrictions on the national
ownership of U.S. airlines.
Within this context, the Productivity Commission1was asked by the Aus-
tralian government to recommend the best policy for the Australian people
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1. The Productivity Commission, an independent statutory agency, is the Australian gov-
ernment’s principal advisory body on microeconomic policy and regulation. Its reports, to-
gether with submissions made to it in the course of its inquiries, are available without charge
on its website: http://www.pc.gov.au.as a whole.2Industry protection as such was not an objective within the gov-
ernment’s Terms of Reference for the inquiry, nor is it within the matters
that the commission is required to consider by its act.
The commission caused surprise in some quarters by not recommending
unilateral liberalization (Productivity Commission 1998). The reason was
that in the tight bilateral system, unilateral liberalization could not be guar-
anteed to increase the traﬃc between Australia and other countries. The
trading conditions have to be agreed upon by the parties at both ends of a
ﬂight (and with intermediate countries, if there are any). Thus, the terms of
trade (here meaning the terms of aviation trade) are negotiated between the
parties, and no country is a “small country” in the usual economic sense of
being unable to aﬀect its terms of trade.
The commission recommended that the Australian government try to ne-
gotiate an open plurilateral club of open-skies agreements and, better still,
a liberal multilateral agreement for aviation under the GATS. However,
within the constraints of the bilateral system the commission’s main rec-
ommendation was that the government attempt to negotiate agreements
that are as unrestricted as possible with the bilateral partners. The policy
would oﬀer unrestricted capacity, routes (including intermediate and be-
yond points), fares, code sharing, number of designated airlines, and own-
ership as a basis for designation. (A policy of unilateral unrestricted open
skies, within overall negotiated capacity, was recommended for all airports
with the exception of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth, on the
grounds that negotiating power was limited for all airports except these
four.) Domestic cabotage was to be negotiated bilaterally. The government
has accepted these recommendations, with the exception of that relating to
cabotage.
Lessons that can be drawn from this inquiry relate to the danger of going
down the path of product-speciﬁc reciprocity (Snape 2001). Even if indus-
try protection is not a part of the objective of the policy framework (and
even if it were, there are likely to be other and better means by which to pur-
sue it), the ability to pursue the general interest is limited by the stance of
foreign partners to the bilateral agreements.
Generic principles and agreements are, of course, of no use for those in-
dustries for which their application is excluded. However, there would ap-
pear to be no reason in principle that generic principles and regulations (in-
ternational and national) could not be applied to all forms of international
transport (of goods, people, and services), whether it is provided in physi-
cal form, by wire, or by the electromagnetic spectrum. The regulation could
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2. The commission’s act requires it to have regard (inter alia) to the need “to improve the
overall economic performance of the economy through higher productivity in the public and
private sectors in order to achieve higher living standards for all members of the Australian
community” and “to reduce regulation of industry . . . where this is consistent with the social
and economic goals of the Commonwealth Government.”then address the basic national objectives, rather than being speciﬁc to par-
ticular modes of transport. If the objective is industry protection as such,
there are more eﬃcient means by which to achieve it than through a morass
of bilaterally restrictive agreements, which in many cases provide few in-
centives for economy eﬃciency.
How international aviation would develop in a multilateral, nondiscrim-
inatory aviation world is a matter of conjecture. Hub and spoke systems
could well develop, as in the United States, together with airline mergers
that would in part replace the current alliances. General competition pol-
icy, national and across jurisdictions, would then have a higher proﬁle in
aviation. Such generic policies could be expected to promote competition,
whereas the current bilateral system has at its roots the restriction of inter-
national competition.
3.3 Objectives for Services Regulation
Services are regulated to pursue a variety of objectives, economic and
noneconomic. Among the former are problems associated with asymmetric
information (including consumer protection and prudential requirements),
monopoly (including natural monopolies), public goods and externalities,
protection of intellectual property, and the improvement of the terms of
foreign trade and investment. There are also technical matters (e.g., the
scarcity of the radio frequency spectrum) that are of economic importance.
Among the noneconomic objectives are distributional matters including
universal availability, cultural and social objectives, and national owner-
ship. Of course, there are also straight-out industry protection objectives for
many governments.
3.3.1 Foreign Investment and Establishment
Of the national economic objectives, only the terms of trade and invest-
ment, and some externalities (in particular in the form of technology trans-
fer), would seem to be matters on which policy would lead necessarily to a
consideration of measures that would discriminate between foreigners and
nationals. However, there would seem to be no diﬀerence in principle here
between policies for goods and for services. The fact that many services
could not be traded without establishment would not of itself imply that
diﬀerent principles should be applied to investment in the production of
goods and investment in the production of services. Many goods also might
be traded only (or more eﬃciently) if a local presence is established for as-
sembly or distribution.
If there are externalities associated with some investments but not others
(for example, knowledge transfer), then these diﬀerences may lead to diﬀ-
erential treatment of diﬀerent investments. However, that does not neces-
sarily lead to diﬀerent treatment of investments in goods production in gen-
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reason to assume that as a general proposition investment in services is
more or less a source of knowledge transfer or of other externalities than in-
vestment in goods production. Similarly, if national ownership is a govern-
ment objective, there would seem to be no reason to discriminate on a gen-
eral basis between goods and services (although, of course, governments
may decide such ownership is more important for some industries than
others).
Thus, there would appear to be a case for generic rules to apply to in-
vestments in both goods and services domestically as well as in interna-
tional agreements. However, the fate of the proposed Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment suggests that such a broad approach at the multilateral
level will be some time away. In the meantime, the multilateral rules gov-
erning investment related to goods trade are quite weak; for services, apart
from the requirement for nondiscrimination, their strength under the
GATS depends mainly on the speciﬁc commitments undertaken by mem-
bers for particular sectors.
3.3.2 Consumer Protection
As to asymmetric information or consumer protection, there is much that
is applicable to both goods and services. Just as many services are regulated
for consumer protection, many goods are subject to regulations aimed at
the same type of objective—for example, safety speciﬁcations for motor ve-
hicles. Generally it is better to specify requirements in terms of perfor-
mance rather than inputs: for example, that tractors should not turn over
on forty-ﬁve-degree slopes, rather than that they should have a tonne of bal-
last at wheel level. Since 1947, Article III of the GATT has stated that reg-
ulations and requirements aﬀecting the internal sale of products should not
be applied so as to aﬀord protection to domestic production. However, this
has not prevented the adoption of unique national requirements. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (as well as the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Products) addresses such
matters for goods.3 The agreement requires that technical barriers “are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjus-
tiﬁable discrimination among countries where the same conditions prevail
or a disguised restriction on international trade” (Preamble), and that for-
eign (WTO member) products should receive treatment that is no less fa-
vorable than like products of national origin (Article 2.1). Technical regu-
lations should not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade and
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3. The emphasis of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Products is on harmo-
nization of international standards, but allowing for diﬀerent standards when there is scientiﬁc
justiﬁcation that is related to the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health. Mea-
sures should not discriminate among members of the WTO where identical or similar condi-
tions prevail.should not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulﬁll a legitimate ob-
jective. These objectives are national security, prevention of deceptive prac-
tices, and protection of human health or safety, of animal or plant life or
health, or of the environment (Article 2.2). Adoption of international stan-
dards and standards based on performance are encouraged.4 These provi-
sions apply to all goods, whether or not they have been subject to negoti-
ated trade barrier reductions and commitments.
In services, performance standards designed for the protection of con-
sumers are often diﬃcult to apply: medical practice is the classic example.
(Ex ante rather than ex post protection is generally preferred.) Thus, do-
mestic regulations frequently specify required qualiﬁcations for service
suppliers, and professional titles (such as architect, doctor, lawyer, and uni-
versity) are reserved by legislation for those persons or institutions with the
qualiﬁcations deemed appropriate. Although the emphasis on the qualiﬁ-
cations of providers rather than on performance makes it diﬃcult to spec-
ify generic rules across professions at the national as well as at the interna-
tional level, there is scope for generic rules in multilateral agreements in
regard to the foreign treatment of national qualiﬁcations.
In the GATS, Article VI.4 provides for the Council of Trade in Services
(through bodies it may establish) to develop any necessary disciplines to en-
sure that measures relating to qualiﬁcations, technical standards, and li-
censing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in ser-
vices. It speciﬁes that such disciplines should be based on objective and
transparent criteria and are not more burdensome that necessary to ensure
quality, and that licensing procedures are not in themselves a restriction on
supply. Such provisions would cover all services. Until such disciplines are
developed, GATS provides that in those sectors for which there are speciﬁc
commitments by members, these principles should apply. Little progress
appears to have been made to develop these disciplines of general applica-
tion for services. This is in contrast to goods, where the Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade has general application.
As well as these provisions, Article VII of GATS provides for mutual or
unilateral recognition of qualiﬁcations acquired abroad. Importantly, it
provides that such recognition should not be applied in a manner that
would discriminate between members in whose countries similar qualiﬁca-
tions or experience have been obtained.
It would seem desirable to have a common set of principles for the recog-
nition of standards, qualiﬁcations, and licensing requirements covering
goods and services. Although there are two agreements covering the same
issue, one for goods, the other for services (and the latter only for scheduled
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4. Many product standards fall outside these provisions (the screw pitch of nuts and bolts,
for example), whereas many that may be covered (for example, diﬀerent safety speciﬁcations
for motor vehicles and electrical connections) may inhibit trade but do not appear to be con-
structed for this purpose.services), there are possibilities of inconsistencies even if the intent is the
same.
In three recent Productivity Commission inquiries related to services—
gambling, broadcasting, and architects—consumer protection has been an
important issue. In the broadcasting inquiry, the regulation of content was
addressed, in particular pornography and other material deemed by Parlia-
ment to be unsuitable for broadcasting. There are many issues here, includ-
ing whether the rules for the Internet should be akin to those for books and
magazines or to those for free-to-air (or subscription) broadcasting. (Tech-
nological convergence could suggest that all electronic platforms be treated
in a similar manner, although there are also arguments that would distin-
guish between one-to-one dissemination and one-to-many.)
During the course of the inquiry, the government introduced regulation
of online content. The regulations attempt to prohibit objectionable mate-
rial hosted on Internet sites in Australia. They also attempt to require Aus-
tralian Internet service providers to prevent Australians from obtaining ac-
cess to material found to be objectionable (PC 2000a, 482–3).
On gambling, among other things the commission was asked to report on
“the social impacts . . . , the cost and nature of welfare support services . . .
the eﬀects of regulatory structure . . . the implications of new technologies
(including the internet), including the eﬀects of traditional government
controls on the gambling industries.... ”
While emphasizing that there were substantial consumer beneﬁts (enter-
tainment, etc.) accruing from gambling, the commission also drew atten-
tion to the risks and costs arising from problem gambling. Lack of adequate
information regarding the “odds,” or price of gambling, and addictive be-
havior (together with the design of gambling machines that encouraged, or
at least did not discourage, addictive behavior) were seen as the main prob-
lems. (There were also problems with government-legislated restrictions on
competition in the supply of gambling facilities, complex and inconsistent
regulation, and what some commentators have described as addiction by
governments to the revenue from gambling.)
The commission saw avenues of regulation that would provide greater in-
formation and protection for consumers and support for problem gamblers.
The development of Internet gambling raises questions, some of which were
not unlike those associated with broadcasting, particularly in the interna-
tional dimension. This involves taxation as well as consumer protection
issues. Within Australia, the tax question is being solved by an agreement
between jurisdictions that the tax revenue should be repatriated to the
(Australian) jurisdiction of the gambler. Implementation requires licensing
and enforcement. Internationally, such agreements would be much more
diﬃcult to achieve.
As with broadcasting of pornography, a main question was not whether
online activities should be restricted, but the extent to which they could be
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being to reduce demand for and access to unlicensed gambling sites. Li-
censing is much easier to enforce for domestic sites than internationally,
and just as unlicensed organized gambling is illegal in many countries and
there are penalties on both suppliers and customers, so it could be with do-
mestic gambling sites.
International sites pose more diﬃculty; they could oﬀer better odds if
taxes are not levied, although they would not be popular if the payment of
winnings was in doubt or unenforceable. Blocking international sites prob-
ably is technically feasible, but the cost eﬀectiveness can be questioned—
particularly if it were to be attempted on a general basis rather than in re-
sponse to complaints. Blocking, other than in response to complaints,
would be even more diﬃcult for pornography: a search engine found about
7,000 “Internet gambling” sites but about 5 million sites that combined
“XXX” and “sex” (PC 1999, 18.44). In broadcasting, the commission rec-
ommended that there be a review of the pornography policies when they
have been in operation for one year.
A lesson from gambling and broadcasting is that addressing consumer
protection objectives for services traded electronically is becoming more
and more diﬃcult. The consequence of e-commerce for international trade
and trade rules is being investigated by many, including Drake and Nico-
laidis (2000): regulation is likely to become increasingly diﬃcult in some ar-
eas, and in some less necessary. (Of course, technological changes may lead
to increased concentration and make the case for regulation stronger in
some areas.) The principles of eﬃcient regulation imply that generic rather
than industry-speciﬁc platform-speciﬁc regulation should be sought as far
as possible. The case for technological neutrality is strengthened substan-
tially by rapid, and unforeseeable, technical change and by the impossibil-
ity of predicting the consequences. Here, however, as in some other service
areas (for example, telecommunications), technology and other factors
may require that the generic give way to the speciﬁc at some level. Good reg-
ulation would seem to call for the presumption to be for generic rules and
principles, with the onus to be on justiﬁcation for departures from them.
The Terms of Reference for the inquiry into architects speciﬁed that the
commission report on “the preferred option for regulation, if any, of the ar-
chitectural professional in Australia.” In its report the commission took the
view that there was no strong consumer protection case for retaining the
legislated protection of the title “architect” and that the relevant legislation
should be repealed (PC 2000b). It took the view that if there were public
beneﬁt in providing a stamp of approval, then that could be given by a pro-
fessional body, as it is in many other professions, such as engineering and
accounting. Building regulations are such that safety considerations are not
relevant for the legislated restriction on the use of the term architect.
International considerations were raised in the course of the inquiry. Ar-
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ferred to above. If other jurisdictions require government certiﬁcation of ar-
chitects for them to practice in their country, would the lack of government
certiﬁcation in Australia imply that Australian architects would be disad-
vantaged? Of course, the mutual recognition provisions of Article VII do
not require that certiﬁcation must be in the same form in the mutually rec-
ognizing jurisdictions: professional body recognition could suﬃce. On the
other hand, if government certiﬁcation were required for export of archi-
tectural services, it could be provided for those who wished to export. The
commission saw no consumer or other reason that it should be required for
all architects.
3.3.3 Social and Cultural Objectives
Social and cultural objectives are high on the agenda for many govern-
ments. Such matters are, of course, particularly diﬃcult to deﬁne or mea-
sure, but so too are love and beauty, but few would deny their existence and
importance. For the commission’s inquiry into broadcasting, the Terms of
Reference required it to “advise on practical courses of action to improve
competition, eﬃciency and the interests of consumers in broadcasting ser-
vices. In doing so, the Commission should focus particular attention on bal-
ancing the social, cultural and economic dimensions of the public interest
and have due regard to the phenomenon of technological convergence to
the extent that it may impact upon broadcasting markets.” The existing act
was referred to in the Terms of Reference as seeking “to protect certain so-
cial and cultural values, including promoting a sense of Australian identity,
character and cultural diversity; encouraging plurality of opinion and fair
and accurate coverage of matters of national and local signiﬁcance.... ”
At present there are tight limits to foreign equity investments in free-to-
air and subscription television and in newspapers, but no limits for radio.
There are rules that restrict cross-media investments: for example, the same
enterprise cannot own both a newspaper and a television station in the same
broadcast licence area. There are also rules for commercial free-to-air tele-
vision regarding minimum overall Australian content, children’s programs
and documentaries, and Australian advertising content, and agreed indus-
try codes for Australian music on commercial radio.
The commission did “not attempt to evaluate or comment on the social
and cultural objectives of content regulation. Rather it takes the stated so-
cial and cultural objectives as given and . . . attempts to clarify them and to
consider whether the existing policies address them eﬀectively” (PC 2000a,
379). It attempted to distinguish between those policies that were essentially
industry protection and those that addressed the social, cultural, and di-
versity objectives. The rapidly changing technology had implications for its
recommendations as well as for more general regulation of broadcasting.
The commission concluded that the case for restricting foreign invest-
88 Richard H. Snapement on the grounds that foreigners would be less likely to promote Aus-
tralian culture was at best weak. It was not regarded as an appropriate pol-
icy instrument for this objective, an objective that is also addressed by the
content quotas. More important was that diversity of media ownership
(and hence of sources of information and content) was more likely to be
promoted by treating foreign investment in the media in the same manner
as foreign investment in other industries, that is, by not prescribing any lim-
its. Recognizing the media concentration can be a problem, that the current
cross-media rules were rapidly becoming obsolete through technical change
(the rules do not cover the Internet or subscription television), and that this
technological change could in the future multiply the sources of informa-
tion and comment greatly, the commission recommended that the Trade
Practices Act should be amended immediately to include a media-speciﬁc
public interest test that would apply to all proposed media mergers. Thus
social, cultural, and political dimensions of the public interest would be
considered, in addition to the standard economic questions attending
mergers. The commission also recommended that after regulatory barriers
to entry in broadcasting had been removed and spectrum became available
for new broadcasters, and after the repeal of restrictions on foreign invest-
ment, the cross-media rules should be removed.
For the content rules, the commission made the judgment that the re-
quirement that advertising be 80 percent Australian was essentially aimed
at industry assistance and that any valuable cultural or social “Australian-
ness” would be likely to be met by advertisers, in their own interests, as a
means to engage their (Australian) audience. (In any case, the 80 percent
minimum has been exceeded regularly by about 10 percentage points.) The
commission also decided that the children’s, documentary, and Australian
drama requirements were targeted to the social and cultural objectives
more than is the advertising quota. In part the case for the quotas arises
from the public-good nature of free-to-air television and Hotelling-type
considerations.5 The 55 percent overall Australian requirement was re-
garded as being much less targeted to social or cultural (or Hotelling-type
and public-good) considerations.
More important however, was the new technology. The commission took
the view that it was better to target the social and cultural objectives di-
rectly, rather than through particular broadcast platforms. It rejected the
view that as new broadcast platforms develop, the content rules should be
extended to them according to their degree of “inﬂuence.”6 Such a policy
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5. This refers to the tendency, when there are few commercial free-to-air broadcasters (ﬁ-
nanced by advertising), for all of them to focus on the mass market, with none catering for thin-
ner demand, even though individuals in these parts of the market may have strong content
preferences.
6. The supposed extent of inﬂuence of various forms of broadcasting is an important crite-
rion for the degree of content regulation in the existing Broadcasting Act.would at best be one of “catch-up.” Further, it recognized that regulating in-
ternational electronic traﬃc will become increasingly diﬃcult as its volume
increases and as technologies develop. Instead, it recommended that to en-
sure that the social and cultural objectives of broadcasting continue to be
addressed in the future digital media environment, the government should
commission an independent public inquiry into Australian audiovisual in-
dustry and cultural policy, to be completed by 2004. Following this review,
but prior to the ﬁnal switch-oﬀ of analog television services, a new frame-
work of audiovisual industry and cultural policy should be implemented. It
recommended that the inquiry be based on the government’s competition
principles: that is, that regulations that restrict competition should be re-
tained only if the beneﬁts to the community as a whole outweigh the costs
and if the objectives can be met only through restricting competition.
The aim of the commission in these recommendations was to encourage
policies that were targeted on objectives and that were generic. The inten-
tion was that the policies not be platform-speciﬁc, both with regard to cul-
tural and social objectives of audiovisual services (and perhaps the per-
forming arts in general) and with respect to diversity of sources of
information and content.
3.3.4 Access to Essential Facilities
Access to essential facilities has been a burning issue since the early days
of negotiation of the GATS. It is also a pressing topic of policy in competi-
tion policy within many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) and other countries. It is a matter that may apply to ser-
vices rather more than to goods, although there would be no point in
removing tariﬀs on imported goods if the imported goods did not have ac-
cess to ports, unloading facilities, and internal transport.7
It was argued during the negotiation of the GATS that there was no point
in removing frontier barriers to, say, telecommunications, if access could
not be obtained to (monopoly) domestic distributions systems. Conse-
quently, Article XVI (Market Access) was negotiated. For sectors in which
market access commitments are made, it provides that there should be no
limitations on suppliers (number, output, etc., or legal structure), or on for-
eign capital, unless the restrictions are speciﬁed in the member’s schedule.
Article VIII provides that for services subject to speciﬁc commitments, mo-
nopoly suppliers should not abuse their monopoly power, cross-subsidize
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7. Article III.1 and III.4 of the GATT has some relevance here. For goods production there
is also the matter of access to essential raw materials. This was much in the minds of the nego-
tiators of the original GATT, with the backdrop of the trade policies of the 1930s. It is reﬂected
in the Preamble of GATT1947: “developing the full use of the resources of the world,” and in
the provisions of Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) that apply to
exports as well as imports, although this article in fact allows for export prohibitions on “prod-
ucts essential to the exporting party.”other activities, or act in a manner that discriminates among foreign mem-
bers of the WTO or is inconsistent with specific commitments of the
member.
In the course of GATS negotiations on telecommunications, a reference
paper was developed to establish principles for interconnection—without
distinction between domestic and foreign telecommunication suppliers. It
provided for interconnection to be supplied on terms no less favorable than
for the owner’s own like services or for those for nonaﬃliated service pro-
viders. Mattoo (1999, 22) proposes that the same principles should be ap-
plied to other network services (e.g., transport terminals, energy services,
and sewage). It could also be extended to embrace all forms of internal dis-
tribution. In this way horizontal or generic rules could be developed that
cover goods and services, although the speciﬁcs of application would have
to be diﬀerent for each industry.
There is some tension between requiring access to essential facilities and
incentives to invest where, for reasons of economies of scale or scope, it is
eﬃcient for there to be only one network supplier. If access to upstream or
downstream competitors is required (or feared), then an investment in the
essential facility may not be undertaken or may be truncated, even though
the investment may be in the general interest. International competition
rules need to allow for such tensions, as do domestic competition rules. The
analytical problems here are by no means settled in principle, while the poli-
cies stemming from them depend on circumstances. Thus, although objec-
tives could be agreed under the GATS or elsewhere, international rules to
achieve them are probably best framed to allow discretion for national au-
thorities in pursuing the objectives and for cooperation among these au-
thorities.
3.4 Conclusion
A lesson that one can draw from the above is not surprising: that it is best
to use policy structures that are attuned to objectives and to seek generic
policies in this context. Trade policies are appropriate for trade objectives,
social and cultural policies are appropriate for social and cultural objec-
tives, investment policies are appropriate for investment objectives, compe-
tition policies are appropriate for competition objectives, and so on. Poli-
cies  attuned to particular trade, investment, social and cultural, and
competition (and so on) objectives should extend beyond speciﬁc industries
and beyond speciﬁc forms of production, consumption, and trading.
This then leads to the development of consistent domestic and interna-
tional rules for cross-border trading of goods and services, and to the con-
clusion that these rules should address cross-border trading alone and not
such other issues as conditions of competition that apply to both domestic
and foreign enterprises. Competition rules (for goods and services) are best
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domestic or foreign sources, although they will require adaptation to spe-
ciﬁc industries. Similarly, investment laws (domestic or international) are
best designed to address investment consistently, whether it be for goods or
services production.
Again, social and cultural objectives are best pursued by policies that do
not discriminate between the platforms on which a particular service may
be disseminated. As in many areas, it is consumption (and perhaps produc-
tion) of cultural services (and goods) from which the cultural beneﬁts may
ﬂow, not the platform of dissemination nor international trade as such.
(Messerlin and Cocq [1999] discuss some of the problems in the European
Union of attempting to assist cultural industries through the platforms of
dissemination.)
In the multilateral context there is the question of how to go from here to
there. A multilateral agreement on investment is oﬀ the agenda for the time
being; an agreement for competition policy is also some distance away. The
WTO reference paper on principles for telecommunications interconnec-
tion has been referred to above and could provide a basis for a generic pol-
icy on access to essential facilities, for incorporation into a competition
agreement. The OECD secretariat is exploring a “cluster” approach for sec-
tor services that are closely related in terms of either production intercon-
nections or the manner of regulation, and this could lead some way in the
direction of generic policies. 
A key issue is to contain the use of policies to address objectives for which
the policies are not well suited. A prime example of this practice is the use
of international trade policies to improve labor standards or the environ-
ment. However, perhaps most important is for countries’ domestic policies
to align objectives and policies consistently and eﬃciently.
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Comment Takatoshi Ito
This paper is a useful survey on policy issues on service trade. As the title
suggests, the author forcefully argues that matching policy objectives
closely with policy tools is important. When policy objectives are given, it
is better to use domestic subsidies, taxation, or regulations rather than in-
ternational trade policies. I support this principle. The author, citing stud-
ies and reports done by the Productivity Commission, elaborated the prin-
ciple with real-world examples in Australia, frequently referring to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
In general, policy interventions in the market are called for when there
are market failures—that is, when optimal resource allocation is not
achieved through the market mechanism. Market failures arise from asym-
metric information, externalities, public goods, scale economies, uncer-
tainty, lack of complete markets, and other reasons. Cases have been ex-
plored in the literatures of advanced microeconomics and industrial
organizations. Although the author is not explicit in this characterization,
the author makes careful examinations of market failures in the context of
services, as opposed to goods, and to the international aspects. It is inter-
esting to examine what kinds of modiﬁcations are needed when well-known
results in the domestic context are applied to international trades.
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sity, Tokyo, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Many services sectors have their own characteristics and particular pol-
icy requirements, even in the domestic context. It is important and interest-
ing to explore how these services—such as aviation, banking and other ﬁ-
nancial services, telecom, legal service, medical service, and the like—are
treated in international services trade policies.
Let me take up a particular example that the author highlights in the pa-
per, namely, international aviation, that is a remarkable example of failure
in the services trade framework. International aviation is governed by a net-
work of bilateral agreements, rather than a comprehensive multilateral
treaty; discrimination, rather than equal treatment, is the norm; domestic
routes are typically prohibited for foreign airlines. The author explains a
recommendation of the Productivity Commission to the government. The
recommendation was “to negotiate an open plurilateral club of open-skies
agreements and, better still, a liberal multilateral agreement for aviation un-
der the GATS.” An interesting part of the recommendations is that unilat-
eral unrestricted open skies was not recommended for airports in Sydney,
Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth, on the ground that “negotiating power
was limited for all airports except these four.”
Now let me raise several issues that are inherent in international aviation.
First, history matters. International aviation has been largely governed by a
series of bilateral agreements and a cartel-like multilateral agreement (e.g.,
what used to be airfare agreements under the International Air Transport
Association) on capacity controls and airfare controls. The United States,
which is usually a harbinger of liberalization in many other areas, is not
completely innocent in the ﬁeld of international aviation, although the
United States has recently been pushing for “open skies.” The United States
still imposes a restriction in cabotage (foreign carriers operating the do-
mestic routes) and a restriction on investment in domestic carriers (ceiling
in percentage of ownership). These restrictions eﬀectively protect domestic
carriers.
It is diﬃcult to scratch all bilateral agreements in order to establish a
comprehensive multilateral aviation treaty. The past bilateral agreements
have typically favored particular airlines as “incumbent” carriers. As de-
regulation proceeded, the dividing line of the common interest often lies
between incumbents and newcomers. It is well known that in the United
States-Japan air service negotiation of the late 1980s to 1990s, the interests
of United and Northwest have more common elements with Japan Airlines
than American and Delta.
Second, production of airline services is characterized by technology of
scale economies, primarily due to large ﬁxed costs and network externality.
Even in the domestic markets of small advanced countries and emerging-
market economies, only one or two airlines would be fit to survive under
a completely deregulated environment. When deregulation is extended to
international services, scale economies would imply that some countries
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its establishment of a single market vividly illustrate the point. Therefore,
promoting liberal international aviation may result in a loss of domestically
owned airlines. When the number of airlines declines domestically, region-
ally, and globally, there may be a danger of monopolistic pricing. The key
to preventing monopolistic pricing is to guarantee free entry (and with aﬃr-
mative action–like encouragement) and to promote contestable markets. A
relevant question here is whether contestability is easier or more diﬃcult to
obtain in international airline markets compared to domestic airline mar-
kets.
Third, landing slots are scarce resources. When capacity constraints are
binding, competition policy relying on deregulation and contestability may
not work. A standard answer in economics for such a situation is an auction
of scarce resources. However, auctions may further aggravate a problematic
aspect of “scale economies.” There are similarities to telecom frequency
auctions. Unless landing spots of destination cities’ airports are open or
auctioned, unilateral auctions may not enhance national welfare of domes-
tic consumers and companies.
Fourth, it has become diﬃcult to deﬁne national welfare. Cross-border
airline alliances—such as Star Alliance, One World, and Skyteam—have
developed strong common business strategies, such as code sharing,
through check-ins, and sharing airport lounges. Dividing lines of interest
may be drawn between diﬀerent alliances rather than across national bor-
ders. In this decade, Japanese airlines—Japan Airlines and All Nippon Air-
ways—are aligned with U.S. airlines—American and United, respec-
tively—in accordance with business aﬃliations. The nationality of airlines,
or even the incumbent-newcomer classiﬁcation, is no longer relevant in
companies’ welfare. The national policy goal becomes complicated, al-
though maximizing consumers’ welfare remains most important.
As shown above, a particular case such as international aviation can be
studied carefully to analyze important factors in examining international
service trade.
Let me raise some other issues that will be deemed important in the near
future. Markets are changing, and regulatory considerations often have to
chase the reality. First, e-commerce is spreading very quickly. One can pur-
chase books, music, and ﬁnancial products on-line. These will enhance
competition internationally. Therefore, local physical stores will be under
pressure. What used to be considered “nontradables” are now under inter-
national competitive pressure. Building transparent and equitable rules on
these e-commerce transactions, including taxation rules, will be important.
Second, loss of nationality is imminent from international alliances such as
in international aviation and telecom companies. Other examples may fol-
low. These will enhance the case for multilateral competition policy. Third,
competition between diﬀerent sectors may complicate competition policy.
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companies will be competing in similar products, such as in the market of
“last mile” in local telephone service. Competition policy had to be recon-
sidered in this environment of greater contestability. Monopoly in one tech-
nology does not guarantee rents. This also calls for a multilateral frame-
work  for competition policy across industries that were traditionally
diﬀerent.
In sum, the paper is an excellent survey on the issues surrounding inter-
national service trade. My comments are meant to elaborate on some of the
issues raised in the paper. International aviation was used to illustrate fac-
tors that should be considered in coming up with policy prescriptions, and
some of the issues that arise from recent information technology are raised
in arguing a case for multilateral competition policy.
Comment Edwin L.-C. Lai
This is a very interesting and stimulating paper. It tells us of the chaotic na-
ture of the regulation of trade in services nowadays. It also makes us think
about why trade in services is so much more regulated than trade in goods.
The main arguments and points being made are these: (a) generic rules
should be applied across sectors; (b) countries should adopt policies that
achieve the objectives directly rather than indirectly, be they economic, cul-
tural, or social; and (c) it is desirable to have a set of generic principles that
govern trade in both goods and services.
These are intellectually compelling and valid points. They are based on
sound economic principles. The author has given good examples to illus-
trate how to apply generic rules to sectors of similar nature: for example, (a)
transport should include physical (aviation), wire (internet, phone ser-
vices), and electromagnetic wave (broadcast); (b) qualiﬁcations, technical
standards, and licensing requirements should all be governed by one set of
rules; (c) the “principle of interconnection” in telecommunications should
be applied to all network services, such as transport terminals, energy sec-
tors (electricity transmission), and sewerage.
It is hard to establish a set of generic principles for all services. If there is
such a set, it is probably very general. Because of the heterogeneity of ser-
vices, there should be diﬀerent sets of generic principles for diﬀerent groups
of sectors. The process of grouping the sectors and tailor-making rules for
each group of sectors can be a really challenging task because of the com-
plex diﬀerences among the services. In any case, this would seem to be a
necessary ﬁrst step.
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cording to their nature and then establishing a set of generic rules for each
category? Or should we adopt an ad hoc approach—for example, begin
with some sectors for which agreements have been reached, and then try to
apply generic rules to sectors of similar nature? This would be a crucial
question to be answered by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In order to establish generic rules for services liberalization, we would
also need to understand the fundamental diﬀerences between trade in
goods and trade in services. According to the WTO, there are four modes
of supply of services: (a) cross-border supply; (b) consumption abroad; (c)
commercial presence; and (d) movement of natural persons. Trade in goods
occurs mainly in mode (a), and to a lesser extent in mode (c) and (d) in the
case of foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing. Mode (b) is usu-
ally absent in the goods sector. On the other hand, all modes of supply are
common in trade in services.
Moreover, the quality of a service usually depends on the qualiﬁcation
and competence of the personnel delivering the service. Examples are
lawyers, engineers, medical doctors, and so on. In the absence of an inter-
national certifying body, individual countries have to have the right to de-
termine which foreign qualiﬁcations to recognize. The challenge is to estab-
lish generic rules that disallow illegitimate discrimination against foreign
entities yet allow for legitimate discrimination against foreign countries that
have lower standards in the certiﬁcation of personnel. Hence, harmoniza-
tion of qualiﬁcations across countries would seem to be more complicated
than harmonization of standards for goods.
Finally, the delivery of certain services, such as accounting and legal ser-
vices, requires that the personnel understand the institutions and culture of
the country. This necessity can serve as a barrier to trade in these sectors.
Whether or not such culture-related knowledge should be part of the qual-
iﬁcation requirement is a matter of debate. It has to be resolved before
generic rules are set up in these sectors.
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